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Defendants' Standing to Oppose Lead
Plaintiff Appointment Under the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
Tiffany M. Wong"

In 1995, Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act' ("PSLRA" or "Reform Act") in an attempt to discourage the filing of frivolous securities fraud lawsuits.2 Six years
later, the number of federal securities class action filings reached
an all-time high.' While this extraordinarily high number can be
attributed partly to the large increase in initial public offerings
during that time period, the reforms of the PSLRA did not in fact
reduce the number of securities fraud actions brought as Congress had intended. With the size of post-PSLRA settlements also
increasing,5 both plaintiffs and defendants have more at stake
than ever in securities litigations. One reform the PSLRA instituted was a new method of selecting the lead plaintiff. The
PSLRA instructs courts to adopt a presumption that the most
adequate party to represent the plaintiff class is the one with the
greatest financial interest who also satisfies the requirements of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 ("Rule 23").' District courts
currently are split as to whether or not defendants may challenge
the adoption of the lead plaintiff presumption prior to a motion

2

B.A. 2001, Dartmouth College; J.D. Candidate 2004, University of Chicago.
15 USC §§ 77z-1 (2000).
See Eugene Zelensky,
New Bully on the Class Action Block: Analysis of Restrictions

on Securities Class Actions Imposed by the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of
1995, 73 Notre Dame L Rev 1135, 1135-37 (1998) (discussing legislative history).
' Jason Hoppin, SecuritiesFraud Suits Break Record; Record Number of Stock
Fraud
Suits
Filed in
2001,
available
online
at
<http://www.mofo.com/practice/
ArticleDetail.cfm?MCatID=&concentrationlD=14&ID=513&Type=4>
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4Id.
' See Paul A. Ferillo, et al, Still Refusing to Surrender: Strategies for Combating
Class Certification in Securities Class Action Cases, 1332 PLI/Corp 435, 439
(2002) (citing
a Cornerstone Research study of post-Reform Act case settlements).
6 15 USC § 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I).
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for class certification, 7 and appellate courts seem unwilling to
rule on the issue.8 Resolving this question in the defendants' favor could reduce the overall costs of litigation and serve as a possible deterrent to plaintiffs and attorneys who bring frivolous
suits solely in an attempt to force defendants into expensive settlements.9
This Comment argues that defendants should and do have
standing to oppose a motion for lead plaintiff prior to class certification. Part I introduces the background behind the PSLRA and
sets up the framework for analyzing the lead plaintiff provisions.
Part II analyzes the current state of the law, including the various legal and policy rationales behind the court split. Part III examines the relevant text of the statute and its legislative history,
and then presents several public policy arguments in favor of allowing defendants the opportunity to challenge a court's adoption
of the most adequate plaintiff presumption.

I. HISTORY OF THE PSLRA
The PSLRA was the first substantial reform of federal securities law since the Securities Act of 19331" and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were enacted as part of the New Deal legislation.12 Congress perceived that abusive practices were undermining the overriding purposes of the securities laws, which were
to protect investors and maintain the public's confidence in the
securities markets in order to promote investment and capital
growth.1 3 Such abuses included the filing of frivolous class action
lawsuits, initiated by attorneys with the help of "professional
plaintiffs," 4 with no regard for the underlying culpability of the
' See Roger W. Kirby and Ira M. Press, Analysis of Decisions Relating to Disputed
Lead PlaintiffAppointments Under the PSLRA, 1213 PLI/Corp 617, 636 (2000) (citing

cases).
Stuart M. Grant and Christine S. Bulman, Appointment of Lead PlaintiffUnder the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: Update 2001, 1269 PLIICorp 689, 695 (2001)

(citing five instances where appellate courts have refused interlocutory appeals over lead
plaintiff appointments).
' See S Rep No 104-98, 104th Cong, 1st Sess 9 (1995), reprinted in 1995 USCCAN
688 ("Senate Report").
15 USC § 77a-bbbb (2000).
15 USC § 78a-eee (2000).
See Zelensky, 73 Notre Dame L Rev at 1136 (cited in note 2).
See HR Rep No 104-369, 104th Cong, 1st Sess 31 (1995), reprinted in 1995
USCCAN 730 ("House Report").
" See id at 32, reprinted in 1995 USCCAN at 731 (defining "professional plaintiffs" as
investors who own a nominal number of shares in a wide array of public companies and
who readily permit lawyers to file abusive securities class action lawsuits).
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entity being sued. 5 Plaintiffs' lawyers would routinely engage in
a "race to the courthouse" in order to file their complaint first and
consequently be named the lead counsel in a securities class action. 6 Despite the fact that most of these suits were meritless, the
defendant corporations usually chose to settle the cases rather
than face the enormous expenses of discovery and trial. 7 The
plaintiffs' lawyers often negotiated such settlements to favor
themselves 8 rather than the investors they purported to represent. 9
The PSLRA fundamentally altered the lead plaintiff and lead
counsel selection process for securities class actions. The Act instructs courts to adopt a presumption that the "most adequate
plaintiff" to lead the litigation is the investor who (1) has made a
motion to the court to serve as lead plaintiff, (2) has the largest
financial interest in the relief sought, and (3) has otherwise satisfied the requirements of Rule 23.20 Once the lead plaintiff has
been selected, the lead plaintiff then selects lead counsel, subject
to the court's approval."'
In enacting these new provisions, Congress intended to encourage institutional investors, whose assets account for 51 percent of the equity market,22 to serve as lead plaintiffs and exercise
more effective control over the attorneys. 23 Because these investors had such high stakes in the outcome of the lawsuits, they
would be more likely to monitor the lawyers carefully and participate in directing the course of the litigation." The legislature
believed the PSLRA would wrest control of securities litigation
from the plaintiffs' lawyers and place it back into the hands of the
shareholders.2 5
See id.
,6 See Elliot J. Weiss, Comment, The Impact to Date of the Lead PlaintiffProvisionsof
the Private SecuritiesLitigation Reform Act, 39 Ariz L Rev 561, 562 (1997).
17 See Senate Report at 9, reprinted in 1995 USCCAN at 688 (cited in note 9).
Id (quoting testimony that "counsel in securities class actions receive a disproportionate share of the settlement award").
" Id at 6, reprinted in 1995 USCCAN at 685 ("Numerous studies show that investors
recover only 7 to 14 cents for every dollar lost as a result of securities fraud.").
' 15 USCA § 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I). See also Fischler v AmSouth Bancorp, 1997 WL
118429, *2 (M D Fla) (restricting the focus of the inquiry into qualities of the class representative to typicality and adequacy).
21 15 USC § 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(v).
'
See House Report at 34, reprinted in 1995 USCCAN at 733 (cited in note 13) (noting that pension funds account for almost half of all institutional assets).
See id.
'4 See Zelensky, 73 Notre Dame L Rev at 1142-43 (cited in note 2).
'
See Senate Report at 4, reprinted in 1995 USCCAN at 683 (cited in note 9).
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Although a court must presume that the investor with the
largest financial interest is the most adequate lead plaintiff, the
presumption is a rebuttable one. The Reform Act provides that
the presumption may be rebutted upon proof by a member of the
purported plaintiff class that the presumptively most adequate
plaintiff will not fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class or is subject to a unique defense that renders him unable to
adequately represent the class.26 However, the Act does not explicitly address the question of whether a defendant may challenge the "most adequate plaintiff" presumption.
The statute's ambiguity on this question has led courts to
disagree as to when defendants may challenge a party's motion
for appointment as lead plaintiff.27 The majority of courts have
found that defendants do not have standing to mount such an
objection.2" Although only a few courts have explicitly granted
defendants standing to object to the lead plaintiff appointment,29
several more have noted that whether or not defendants have
formal grounds to contest an appointment, a court may, sua
sponte, address any issue brought to its attention by the defendants."°
Courts universally have acknowledged that, regardless of
how this issue is decided, defendants retain their ability to challenge the selection of a lead plaintiff at the class certification
stage.3' However, some members of Congress have expressed concern that the Reform Act's "most adequate plaintiff" presumption
is, in reality, irrebuttable because it already incorporates Rule
23's adequacy and typicality requirements.32 Thus, in some cases,
See 15 USC § 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(iii)(II).
Contrast Gluck v Cellstar Corp, 976 F Supp 542, 550 (N D Tex 1997) ("The statute
is clear that only potentialplaintiffs may be heard regarding appointment of a Lead Plaintiff.") (emphasis in original), with King v Livent, 36 F Supp 2d 187, 190 (S D NY 1999)
("[NJothing in the text of the Reform Act precludes or limits the right of defendants to be
heard on this issue [of appointment].").
8 See Bell v Ascendant Solutions, Inc, 2002 WL 638571, *2 (N D Tex) (collecting
'

cases).
See, for example, King, 36 F Supp 2d at 190; Howard Gunty Profit Sharing v Quantum Corp, Civ No 96-20711 SW, slip op at 1 (N D Cal 1997).

"0See, for example, In re The First Union Corp Securities Litigation, 157 F Supp 2d
638, 641 (W D NC 2000); Takeda v Turbodyne Technologies, Inc, 67 F Supp 2d 1129, 1138
(C D Cal 1999).
" See, for example, Fischler, 1997 WL 118429 at *2 ([T~he determination of lead
plaintiff and lead counsel at this stage does not preclude revisiting the issue upon consideration of a motion for class certification."); Zelensky, 73 Notre Dame L Rev at 1143 (cited
in note 2) (citing cases).
32 See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, S 240, 104th Cong, 1st Sess (June 19,
1995), in 141 Cong Rec S 9114 (June 27, 1995).
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the appointment stage may be the defendants' only opportunity
to challenge the court's selection of the lead plaintiff.

II. INTERPRETING THE LEAD PLAINTIFF PROVISIONS
OF THE PSLRA
Most courts, following the lead of an early Massachusetts
district court ruling,3 3 have interpreted the plain language of the
lead plaintiff provisions in the PSLRA to restrict formal challenges regarding the appointment of the most adequate plaintiff
solely to those made by other purported class members.3 4 However, a subset of those courts has observed that nothing in the
statute prevents them from raising the defendants' objections sua
sponte.35 Presently, only district courts in California and New
York have found that the Reform Act permits defendants to formally question the adoption of the most adequate plaintiff presumption.3 6 These courts are able to justify their position by limiting such challenges to arguments relative to the application of
the presumption.3 7
A. Decisions Finding Defendants Do Not Have Standing to Substantively Challenge the Court's Appointment of the
Presumptive Lead Plaintiff
1. Textual analysis.
One of the earliest cases to examine this lead plaintiff issue
and reject the defendants' standing to challenge the presumption
was Greebel v FTP Software, Inc.35 In Greebel, the defendants objected to Greebel's motion for lead plaintiff status on both procedural and substantive grounds.3 9 They first claimed that the
movants failed to satisfy the PSLRA's certification and notice requirements," which are prerequisites for lead plaintiff selection.
The defendants also argued that it was premature to determine
See, for example, Greebel v FTP Software, Inc, 939 F Supp 57 (D Mass 1996).
See, for example, In re USEC SecuritiesLitigation, 168 F Supp 2d 560, 565 (D Md
2001).
See, for example, Takeda, 67 F Supp 2d at 1138.
See Howard Gunty, Civ No 96-20711 SW, slip op at 1; King, 36 F Supp 2d at 190.
3' See In re Orthodontic Centers of America, Inc, Securities Litigation, 2001 WL
1636846, *2 (E D La) (explaining Howard Gunty and King).
939 F Supp 57 (D Mass 1996).
Id at 59.
40 Id.
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whether the movants satisfied all three of the criteria for most
adequate plaintiff required by the statute.41
The Massachusetts district court held that the defendants
could not oppose the motion on grounds relating to the movants'
satisfaction of the statutory criteria because "Congress provided
that rebuttal of the lead plaintiff presumption shall be limited to
'proof by a member of the purported plaintiff class."'" The court
found that the plain text of the statute was sufficient to preclude
a defendant from making substantive challenges to the appointment of the lead plaintiff prior to the class certification stage.43
However, defendants were permitted to object to the adequacy of
certification and notice because failure to satisfy these procedural
prerequisites would be "fatal to maintenance of the putative class
action." 4 Greebel thus limited a defendant's standing to challenge
a motion for appointment as lead plaintiff to purely procedural
objections. Later courts followed suit in making this distinction
between substantive and procedural challenges when assessing
the defendant's position to refute the most adequate plaintiff presumption. 5
Numerous subsequent courts have agreed that the text of the
PSLRA effectively precludes a defendant from formally challenging a motion for lead plaintiff status on adequacy and typicality
grounds.46 In Gluck v Cellstar Corp, 7 a Texas district court followed the Greebel court's logic and stated that "[tihe statute is
clear that only potential plaintiffs may be heard regarding appointment of a [1]ead [p]laintiff. 4 ' The court reasoned that be-

cause defendants could raise all of their substantive arguments
4' Id.
Greebel, 939 F Supp at 60-61.
43 Id.
44 Id.
41 See, for example, In re USEC Securities Litigation, 168 F Supp
2d 560, 565 (D Md
2001) ("[Dlefendant could object to the adequacy of certification and notice, inasmuch as
they are procedural prerequisites for the court's consideration of a motion for appointment
of a lead plaintiff."); California Public Employees' Retirement System v The Chubb Corp,
127 F Supp 2d 572, 575 n 2 (D NJ 2001) ("[D]efendants do have standing to object to the
form of the notice published by the plaintiff after filing the complaint.").
" See, for example, Bell, 2002 WL 638571 at *2 ("[R]ebuttal of the presumption of the
most adequate plaintiff is limited to 'proof by a member of the purportedplaintiffclass.'");
In re Milestone Scientific Securities Litigation, 183 FRD 404, 414 n 14 (D NJ 1998) ("A
defendant or defendants may not object to the adequacy or typicality of the proposed lead
plaintiff at this preliminary stage of the litigation."); Fischler, 1997 WL 118429 at *2 ("The
plain language of the Act dictates only members of the plaintiff class may offer evidence to
rebut the presumption in favor of the most adequate plaintiff.").
976 F Supp 542 (N D Tex 1997).
Id at 550.
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during the class certification stage, denying them the opportunity
to speak earlier would not unduly prejudice them in any way."
2. Legislative history.
Several of the courts that reject defendants' motions to object
to the appointment of the most adequate plaintiff on textual
grounds have used the Reform Act's legislative history to bolster
their position. The Greebel court noted that Congress intended for
motions for lead plaintiff and motions for class certification to
involve distinct inquiries." Because the Act's underlying purpose
was to allow early intervention and control of the lawsuit by the
most adequate plaintiff, the court reasoned that the designation
of the lead plaintiff should be done as quickly as possible.5'
The Gluck court agreed that Congress intended a speedy lead
plaintiff determination and added that allowing defendants to
voice substantive objections at the appointment stage would
waste judicial resources. It reasoned that the best way to execute congressional intent and benefit all investors in the class
action was to wrest control of the lawsuit away from the lawyers
of nominal plaintiffs and give the power to the largest sharehold53
ers.
3. Sua sponte exceptions.
Several of the courts that have denied defendants' formal
standing to oppose the appointment of a lead plaintiff have nevertheless expressed a willingness to consider the defendants' arguments by raising their issues sua sponte.54 In In re The First
5 5 the court declined to decide
Union Corp Securities Litigation,
See id.
939 F Supp at 60.
See id at 60-61. See also Bell, 2002 WL 638571 at *2 ("Congress intended that
appointment of a Lead Plaintiff occur at an early stage of the litigation, before consideration of certification issues.").
See 976 F Supp at 550.
See id.
See Fields v Biomatrix, 198 FRD 451, 454 (D NJ 2000) ("Even if Defendants do not

have standing, Defendants point out that the Court may, however, sua sponte consider the
issues raised by them."); In re Waste Management, Inc, Securities Litigation, 128 F Supp

2d 401, 410 (S D Tex 2000) ("[Tihis Court may sua sponte evaluate the adequacy of any
proposed person or group of persons as Lead Plaintiffis)."); Takeda, 67 F Supp 2d at 1138
("[D]efendants lack standing to object to the adequacy or typicality of the proposed lead
plaintiff at this preliminary stage . . [nevertheless, the court may sua sponte raise and
address certain of the concerns addressed in defendants' statement.").
' 157 F Supp 2d 638 (W D NC 2000).
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conclusively the issue of the defendants' standing, instead stating, "[riegardless of whether Defendants formally have standing
... nothing in the Reform Act prevents this Court from considering the arguments raised and the authorities cited by Defendants."56 Because a lack of competing plaintiffs prevented any
adversarial presentation of the issue in that particular case, the
First Union court found it especially prudent to consider the defendants' concerns. 57 The courts that have granted sua sponte exceptions thus reasoned that, independent of what Congress may
have written in the text of the PSLRA, they could most effectively
implement the statute's objectives by considering as many viewpoints as possible when determining who would control the litigation.
B. Decisions Finding That the PSLRA Does Not Prevent
Defendants From Challenging the Adoption of the Most
Adequate Plaintiff Presumption
1. Textual analysis.
The California district court, in Howard Gunty Profit Sharing v Quantum Corp," shared the concern identified in First Union, that silencing the defendants' objections in a situation where
no other parties were competing for lead plaintiff status could
result in insufficient information to administer effectively the
most adequate plaintiff presumption.59 However, the Howard
Gunty court took an additional step and explicitly permitted the
defendants to challenge formally whether a particular party fulfilled the substantive statutory requirements to be the most adequate plaintiff."
The court held that the determination of the most adequate
plaintiff under the PSLRA is actually a two-step process.61 A court
must first decide whether or not to adopt the presumption that a
certain party is the most adequate plaintiff based on the three
criteria enumerated in the Act.62 Once this presumption has been

r

Id at 641.

See id.
Civ No 96-20711 SW, slip op at 1 (N D Cal 1997).
' See id at 6.
See id at 2.
Id at 4.
6 Howard Gunty, Civ No 96-20711 SW, slip op at 4.
'
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adopted, other
purported class members may introduce evidence
63
it.
rebut
to
Contrary to the Greebel court's finding that the plain text of
the statute prevented defendants from raising substantive challenges to a motion for lead plaintiff appointment, the Howard
Gunty court found that the text prevents defendants from raising
objections only after the most adequate lead plaintiff presumption
had already been adopted. 64 At that point, the court conceded that
defendants no longer have standing to object."6 The statute, however, is silent on what challenges the court should consider when
determining whether or not to apply the presumption.6 6 Accordingly, the court concluded that "nothing in [the PSLRAI limits
standing of defendants to challenge the sufficiency of a plaintiff's
showing pursuant to [the statutory requirements]. " 67 The court's
textual analysis thus supports permitting defendants to argue
against the application of the most adequate plaintiff presumption itself.
2. Legislative intent.
In King v Livent,6 8 a New York district court bolstered this
textual analysis, noting that the Reform Act did not preclude defendants from challenging a motion for appointment as lead
plaintiff.69 The court noted, "Section (a)(3) of the PSLRA contains
no reference to any participation of a defendant in the appointment process."" The courts in King and Howard Gunty both reasoned that supporting such challenges was consistent with implementing the Reform Act's goal of alleviating the abuses of the
class action device in securities litigation by ensuring that genuine investors, rather than attorneys, were in control of the lawsuit.7 King concludes that "[oln balance, a therapeutic appointment process such as is envisaged by the PSLRA will work better
with more information than less."72

'

Id.
See id at 6-7.
Id.

67

See Howard Gunty, Civ No 96-20711 SW, slip op at 5.
Id at 6.

36 F Supp 2d 187 (S D NY 1999).
Id at 190.
'0 Id.
See King, 36 F Supp 2d at 190; Howard Gunty, Civ No 96-20711 SW, slip op at 7.
72 King, 36 F Supp 2d at 191.
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The purpose of enacting the PSLRA was to eliminate the assignment of lead plaintiff status solely on a first come, first serve
basis and to select instead the party who could most adequately
represent the interests of the entire class.7" Allowing the defendants to point out flaws in a party's motion would ensure that the
requirements for most adequate plaintiff were satisfied, especially in cases where there was only one party seeking to be
named lead plaintiff.7 4 The courts did not want to risk muting the
defendants in such situations for fear that this would open the
door for lawsuits controlled by attorneys rather than true investors."5 Allowing the defendants to participate in the selection of
the lead plaintiff would ensure that the process was completed as
thoroughly as possible and would better serve legislative intent.76
C. Judicial Disagreement About the Depth of Inquiry a Court
Must Undertake Prior to Adopting the Most Adequate
Plaintiff Presumption
In addition to disagreeing about how to interpret the lead
plaintiff provisions of the PSLRA, courts are also divided on the
issue of how thoroughly they must examine whether a party
meets the necessary Rule 23 criteria before they adopt the most
adequate plaintiff presumption.77 The conflict centers around how
much evidence is sufficient to meet the showings of adequacy and
typicality required under Section 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(cc). Resolving this question draws attention to how much a defendant
stands to lose from a preliminary determination about the plaintiff class's adequacy of representation.
The Gluck court found that no more than a "preliminary
showing" of the Rule 23 elements was necessary to satisfy the
requirements of the Reform Act." Such a low threshold would
satisfy Congress's intent that the lead plaintiff determination be

7 Clinton Foreign Policy, 104th Cong, 1st Sess in 141 Cong Rec H 13691, 13700 (Nov
28, 1995).
7' See Howard Gunty, Civ No 96-20711 SW, slip op at 6-7.
7 See id at 7. See also In re Orthodontic Centers of America, 2001 WL 1636846 at *2
("[Tihe Court will consider the arguments raised by the defendants as there are no competing claims to ensure compliance with the Act by other plaintiffs . . . [but] will limit its
consideration to the arguments relative to the application of the presumption.").
, See Howard Gunty, Civ No 96-20711 SW, slip op at 7.
Contrast Greebel, 939 F Supp at 60, with In re CriticalPath, Inc, Securities Litigation, 156 F Supp 2d 1102, 1110 (N D Cal 2001).
" 976 F Supp at 546.
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made quickly and easily at an early stage of litigation. 79 Additionally, prospective lead plaintiffs would not be burdened unduly by
being forced to incur unnecessary expenses in order to provide
extensive evidentiary proof of adequacy and typicality. ° The
Third Circuit has embraced the view explicated in Gluck, finding
it consistent with the statutory structure and legislative history
of the PSLRA." The court concluded that a mere prima facie
showing of adequacy and typicality by the movant would be sufficient for the application of the most adequate plaintiff presumption. 2 At least one court has disagreed with the majority position
that plaintiffs need only satisfy minimum standards of adequacy
and typicality. The Northern District of California, in In re Critical Path, Inc, Securities Litigation,3 explicitly declined to follow
Gluck, stating that "[tihe fact that a searching inquiry under
Rule 23 is not required at this stage of the litigation does not
mean that the Court must pay mere lip service to the requirement of the statute that a prospective lead plaintiff 'satisfy the
requirements of Rule 23.'"" The purpose of foregoing an extensive
Rule 23 inquiry at the appointment stage was best understood as
a means of expediting the litigation, and thus encouraging efficiency, rather than a means of avoiding problems that could affect the class later on in the lawsuit." The court noted that while
the goal of judicial efficiency was an important one, it needed to
be balanced with protecting the interests of the class.86
Defendants under a CriticalPath regime may have a harder
time defeating class certification than they would under a Gluck
regime. If a court has already conducted a thorough inquiry into
adequacy and typicality during the appointment phase, then defendants will have greater difficulty overcoming that showing
during a class certification hearing. Less convincing evidence will
be sufficient to overcome a simple preliminary showing of the
Rule 23 requirements. 7

" See id at 542, 550.
Id.
8 See In re Cendant Corp Litigation, 264 F3d 201, 264 (3d Cir 2001) ("[Tlhe court's
initial inquiry as to whether the movant with the largest losses satisfies the typicality and
adequacy requirements need not be extensive.").
812See

87

id.

156 F Supp 2d 1102 (N D Cal 2001).
Id at 1110.
See id.
Id.
This argument is discussed further in Part III C 3.
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III. DEFENDANTS SHOULD HAVE STANDING TO OPPOSE LEAD
PLAINTIFF APPOINTMENT PRIOR TO CLASS CERTIFICATION

A thorough examination of the PSLRA's text, its legislative
history, and underlying public policy concerns helps resolve the
conflicting judicial interpretations of the statute's lead plaintiff
provisions. While the text is ambiguous, the statutory history
reveals a strong congressional desire to curb the filing of meritless lawsuits and reduce the costs of litigation.88 Although empirical evidence indicates that the PSLRA may not have achieved its
intended effects of reducing the number of securities fraud class
actions filed89 or encouraging more institutional investors to serve
as lead plaintiffs," courts can still advance the goals of judicial
economy and better protection for smaller investors by granting
defendants formal standing to oppose the adoption of the most
adequate plaintiff presumption. Such a move will help ensure
that the plaintiff class is represented by the most capable party
available.
A. Textual Analysis
When interpreting a statute, a court should first look to the
plain language of the statute to interpret its provisions. 9' The
relevant sections of the PSLRA dictating the process of appointment of a lead plaintiff direct:
[T]he court should adopt a presumption that the most
adequate plaintiff in any private action arising under this
subchapter is the person or group of persons that-

See House Report at 34, reprinted in 1995 USCCAN at 733 (cited in note 13).
See Ferillo, et al, 1332 PLI/Corp at 439 (cited in note 5).
See Farah Z. Usmani, Note, Inequities in the Resolution of Securities Disputes:
Individual or ClassAction; Arbitrationor Litigation, 7 Fordham J Corp & Fin L 193, 203

(2001).
" See TVA v Hill, 437 US 153, 184 n 29 (1978) ("When confronted with a statute
which is plain and unambiguous on its face, we ordinarily do not look to legislative history
as a guide to its meaning."). See also Tyler v Douglas, 280 F3d 116, 122 (2d Cir 2001) ("In
determining the proper interpretation of a statute, [tihis court will 'look first to the plain
language of a statute and interpret it by its ordinary, common meaning.'"); Cline v General
Dynamics Land Systems, Inc, 296 F3d 466, 468 (6th Cir 2002) ("The starting point in
determining how a statute is to be applied is the language of the statute itself.").
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(aa) has either filed the complaint or made a motion in response to a notice [advising purported
class members of the complaint];
(bb) in the determination of the court, has the
largest financial interest in the relief sought by
the class; and
(cc) otherwise satisfies the requirements of Rule
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.92
The presumption .. . may be rebutted only upon
proof by a member of the purported plaintiff class
that the presumptively most adequate plaintiff(aa) will not fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class; or
(bb) is subject to unique defenses that
of aderender such plaintiff incapable
93
quately representing the class.
Courts that have denied defendants standing routinely have cited
the passage on rebuttal evidence as their justification.9 4 However,
that logic ignores the point the court raised in Howard Gunty,
that determining the presumption is actually a two-step process
and the second section only applies after the court has already
adopted the presumption. 95
The statutory canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius
lends support to the Howard Gunty position. Applying the maxim
to the statute dictates an inference that all omissions be under15 USC § 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I).

15 USC § 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(iii)(II).
See, for example, Bell, 2002 WL 638571 at *2 ("[R]ebuttal of the presumption of the
most adequate plaintiff is limited to 'proof by a member of the purportedplaintiffclass.'");
In re Milestone Scientific Securities Litigation, 183 FRD 404, 414 n 14 (D NJ 1998) ("A
defendant or defendants may not object to the adequacy or typicality of the proposed lead
plaintiff at this preliminary stage of the litigation."); Fischler, 1997 WL 118429 at *2 ("The
plain language of the Act dictates only members of the plaintiff class may offer evidence to
rebut the presumption in favor of the most adequate plaintiff.").
' See Howard Gunty, Civ No 96-20711 SW, slip op at 6.
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stood as exclusions.96 Under this interpretation, Congress's specific inclusion of "members of the purported plaintiff class" in the
second prong of the most adequate plaintiff inquiry, but not in
the first prong, was done intentionally. This omission demonstrates that Congress wanted to restrict most adequate plaintiff
challenges to purported class members only after the presumption was actually adopted.
Admittedly, a subsequent provision in the Reform Act regarding discovery provides some justification for the prevailing
interpretation that the text precludes defendant challenges. The
statute provides that only "members of the purported plaintiff
class" may conduct discovery relating to whether a certain party
is the most adequate plaintiff, and only after first demonstrating
a reasonable basis for finding the presumptive lead plaintiff incapable of adequate representation." Courts have relied on this
parallel language in reading the plain text of the Act to deny defendants any opportunity to object during the lead plaintiff appointment process.98
While this reading has merit in light of the fact that Congress intentionally used the same phrase in both clauses, one
must still address the ambiguity regarding how the decision to
adopt the most adequate plaintiff presumption is made. The language of the Act states that "the court shall adopt a presumption"
if the three stated criteria are satisfied but gives no details on
how to actually evaluate those criteria." The statute's silence on
the issue raises the question of whether the text was intentionally left vague to give courts discretion, or whether it was mere
oversight on the part of the drafters. A court must therefore look
beyond the text to determine how to interpret and apply the statute.
B. Legislative History
When a statute is silent or ambiguous, courts generally interpret the language in light of the legislative purpose.' 0 Transcripts from congressional debates about the PSLRA reveal that
See Norman J. Singer, 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 47.23 (5th ed 1992).
See 15 USC § 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(iv).
See, for example, King, 36 F Supp 2d at 190.
See 15 USC § 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I).
See, for example, United States v Hudspeth, 42 F3d 1015, 1022 (7th Cir 1994)
("[W]e may turn to the legislative history to interpret a statute only when the statute is
ambiguous.").
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the most adequate plaintiff presumption clause was added into
the proposed bill at the last minute without any public hearings.' Since the legislative history is silent on the specific issue
of whether Congress wanted to allow defendants or other plaintiffs to object to the court's adoption of the presumption, one must
examine legislative intent in light of the overarching goals of the
PSLRA.
The House Conference Report debating the merits of the
PSLRA notes that the new reform provisions of the Act were
added in order "to encourage the most capable representatives of
the plaintiff class to participate in class action litigation and to
exercise supervision and control of the lawyers for the class." 102
Congress ultimately decided that the most capable representatives were institutional investors because they were likely to
share typical claims with smaller investors and thus could represent hundreds of thousands of aggrieved investors at once."'
However, some members of Congress expressed concern that because institutional investors could afford to accept less than full
recoveries, the most adequate plaintiff provisions could actually
harm smaller investors by forcing them to be represented by attorneys who were not willing to invest their time and efforts into
obtaining maximum recovery." 4 These legislators seemed to fear
that courts would adopt the most adequate plaintiff presumption
too liberally, without any real investigation into whether the investor with the largest financial share was truly capable of adequately representing the interests of all class members.1 '
Congress intended the lead plaintiff provisions to protect the
interests of the class by having the most qualified representatives
possible advocating on the class's behalf.0 6 This may favor allowing both other plaintiffs and defendants to point out deficiencies
in the court's selection of the most adequate plaintiff. The House
Report later acknowledged that potential conflicts could arise
from designating the investor with the largest financial stake as
lead plaintiff, although challenges to adequacy and typicality are
only discussed in the context of rebutting the presumption. 017 No
See S 240, 141 Cong Rec S at 9114, 9116 (cited in note 32).
House Report at 31, reprinted in 1995 USCCAN at 730 (cited in note 13).
See S 240, 141 Cong Rec S at 9094 (cited in note 32).
See id at 8908, 8915.
See id.
* See House Report at 31, reprinted in 1995 USCCAN at 730 (cited in note 13).
07 "As a result, this presumption may be rebutted by evidence that the plaintiff would
not fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class or is subject to unique de"
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mention is made of any challenges to the court's selection of the
lead plaintiff that a party may raise before a court has adopted
the most adequate plaintiff presumption. As with the textual
analysis of the statute, the legislative history does not fully clarify Congress's position on the issue of defendants' standing to oppose the appointment of a lead plaintiff.
C. Public Policy Arguments
1. A comprehensive lead plaintiff selection process will
conservejudicial resources.
Courts are often reluctant to conduct a thorough inquiry into
whether a potential lead plaintiff meets the necessary criteria
required by the PSLRA at the appointment stage of litigation.
They reason that, because the issue will be revisited later when
deciding the issue of class certification, a thorough inquiry at the
appointment stage would unnecessarily waste judicial resources. 108 However, under the prevalent interpretation of the
statute, a lead plaintiff will still have to sustain adequacy challenges twice during the litigation-first from purported class
members who wish to rebut the presumption during the appointment stage, and later from defendants during the class certification stage.' °9 By allowing defendants to raise substantive objections alongside other class members early on in the lawsuit,
the court may actually conserve resources by avoiding duplicative
litigation, thereby simplifying and expediting the certification
process. Also, if the court later finds the party designated as the
lead plaintiff during the appointment stage to be an inadequate
representative, the court would have to review the phases of the
lawsuit that the former lead plaintiff oversaw and correct any
errors. Re-litigating would further lengthen an already burdensome process, thereby wasting judicial resources and perhaps
unjustly burdening the defendants.
The high costs of discovery also provide a convincing rationale for allowing defendants to challenge prospective lead plain-

fenses. Members of the purported class may seek discovery on whether the presumptively
most adequate plaintiff would not adequately represent the class." Id at 733.
See, for example, Gluck, 976 F Supp at 550.
' ' See Zelensky, 73 Notre Dame L Rev at 1144 (cited in note 2).
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tiffs prior to class certification."' This is especially true for cases
in which multiple investors seek to be appointed as named plaintiffs."' If the defendants are able to eliminate part of the group at
the outset, then they will save the time and resources of obtaining discovery from those plaintiffs during the class certification
stage."' These savings would promote Congress's goal of reducing
the costs of defending securities class actions."
Because the lead plaintiff provisions were not intended to
change the current law with respect to class certification, 1 4 defendants might abuse a court's willingness to grant them standing to attack the appointment of the lead plaintiff by using it as
an additional opportunity to thwart class certification. However,
judges presumably would be able to see through these tactics. It
is unlikely that a judge who found a party to be an adequate lead
plaintiff over the defendants' objections during the appointment
process would later change his mind without any new, substantial information.
Investing more effort into choosing a lead plaintiff during the
appointment phase would benefit plaintiffs as well as defendants.
The adequacy and typicality requirements of Rule 23 were designed to safeguard the interests of absent class members as well
as to protect defendants from litigating lawsuits where the results would not be binding because of an error in certifying the
class."' It is fairly unlikely that a subsequent court would find
the outcome of a class action nonbinding because of improper certification when other class members were given the opportunity
to protest the adequacy or typicality of the proposed lead plaintiff."6 However, smaller investors may not have had the resources
to conduct the discovery necessary to demonstrate the largest
shareholder to be an inadequate representative of the class.
While defendants' objections are likely made in their own selfinterest,"7 hearing them during the appointment phase could
prove beneficial to the other class members as well.

"1 See Ferillo, et al, 1332 PLI/Corp at 447 (cited in note 5) ("Developing arguments to
defeat class certification is likely to be a fact-intensive undertaking.").
.. Id at 455.
". Id at 457.
113

Id.

...See
"' See
..
6 See
,,7 See

House Report at 34, reprinted in 1995 USCCAN at 733 (cited in note 13).
Weiss, 39 Ariz L Rev at 570 (cited in note 16).

id.
id.
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As noted in Part II, most courts are willing to allow defendants to object to a motion for appointment as lead plaintiff on
procedural grounds, such as inadequate notice or certification,
but not on substantive grounds such as adequacy and typicality."' The Greebel court reasoned that permitting procedural objections would enhance effective judicial administration of the
case since failure to serve proper notice is fatal to maintaining
the class action." 9
The same logic should apply to the substantive requirements
of Rule 23. If the class cannot be certified because the lead plaintiff does not satisfy the adequacy and typicality criteria, then the
class action cannot proceed.' Although the court could then select a different class representative to serve as lead plaintiff and
continue with the litigation, the net result would be unnecessary
expenditures of time and resources for both parties. Since the
lead plaintiff is also the party who designates the lead counsel for
the class, 2' choosing an inadequate class representative could
have extensive ramifications for the other members if the selected
counsel has only the interests of the lead plaintiff in mind rather
than the interests of the entire class.
2. The interests of the plaintiff class are best served by
allowing the courts to have more information when
selecting the class representative.
Setting aside for the moment the potential waste of judicial
resources from giving defendants two separate opportunities to
be heard, if the overall objective of securities reform is protecting
investors and having the most capable representatives possible
leading the litigation, 2 then allowing the defendants to point out
deficiencies in the court's presumptive selection of the lead plaintiff would help achieve that goal. The court should make as in-

,18See,

for example, In re USEC Securities Litigation, 168 F Supp 2d 560, 565 (D Md
2001); Greebel, 939 F Supp at 60.
..
9 939 F Supp at 60. See also Wenderhold v Cylink Corp, 188 FRD 577, 579-80 (N D
Cal 1999) ("Adequacy of notice, after all, is not a matter of concern only to class members.
Defendants also have an interest.. . . To be sure, defendants' interest is a self-interested
one, but so of course is that of plaintiffs.").
" See Ferillo, et al, 1332 PLIICorp at 440 (cited in note 5) ("[Rienewed focus on issues
relating to class certification likely will help defense counsel eliminate some cases altogether, and limit potential liability in others.").
121 See 15 USC § 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(v).
'2
See House Report at 32, reprinted in 1995 USCCAN at 730 (cited in note 13).
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formed a decision as possible."' The plaintiffs can then rely on
the courts to separate out legitimate objections to the adequacy of
the chosen lead plaintiff from unsubstantiated attempts to defeat
class certification.
Although Congress wanted the lead plaintiff to be chosen
quickly so that he could take control of the litigation early in the
process," ' speed should not occur at the expense of the class's interests. Some courts have acknowledged that postponing problems concerning the adequacy of the class representative until
the certification stage is of no benefit to the class." 5 In fact, delaying such problems may create even more trouble for the class, as
the incompetent representative may have set the litigation back.
In one instance, a court preferred selecting no lead plaintiff
rather than one who would endanger the finality of class certification or thwart the goals of the Reform Act.' All of this suggests
that courts should expend a reasonable amount of time and resources in determining whether to presume a party to be the
most adequate lead plaintiff.
Automatically adopting the most adequate plaintiff assumption without any contrary viewpoints can result in the same
abuses of the class action device that Congress sought to avoid
with the enactment of the PSLRA. 1 7 This is especially true in
situations where no other competitors are vying for lead plaintiff
designation. The defendants may be able to provide the court
with crucial information about problems that could potentially
arise in the later stages of the litigation. As the King court noted,
when deciding a question as important as who will be making
decisions for the plaintiff class, a court should have as much information as possible."' Given that principle, giving the defendants standing to challenge the adoption of the most adequate
plaintiff presumption should not be limited to cases where there
is only one party requesting lead plaintiff appointment. Even
with several purported class members competing, the defendants
1

See King, 36 F Supp 2d at 191.

See Gluck, 976 F Supp at 550 (citing Reform Act).
See, for example, In re CriticalPath, 156 F Supp 2d at 1110 ("Refusing to conduct a
thorough Rule 23 inquiry [in order to avoid problems that may affect the class later on in
the lawsuit] is contrary to the interests of the class.").
...See In re Century Business Services, Securities Litigation, 202 FRD 532, 541 (N D

Ohio 2001) ("Given the choice between appointing a lead plaintiff that jeopardizes the
finality of class certification, and appointing a co-lead plaintiff structure that thwarts the
goals of the Reform Act, the Court chooses 'none of the above.'").
See Howard Gunty, Civ No 96-20711 SW, slip op at 6-7.
36 F Supp 2d at 191.
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may be able to raise additional arguments that the other plaintiffs had not considered. Furthermore, a plaintiff's attorney who
wants to control the lawsuit will not be able to escape being challenged by simply getting two different parties to apply for lead
plaintiff.
3. The most adequate plaintiff presumption may,
practice, be irrebuttable.

in

From the defendants' perspective, an important concern is
the refutability of the most adequate plaintiff presumption by the
time the class certification phase arises. While defendants have
the right to challenge the adequacy and typicality of the lead
plaintiff, there is some question as to whether they have any
chance of successfully rebutting the most adequate plaintiff presumption after the court has already conducted a Rule 23 analysis. ' The answer to this question may turn on the depth of the
earlier analysis into adequacy and typicality.
If a court conducts a comprehensive inquiry into whether a
plaintiff meets the statutory criteria for most adequate plaintiff,
then it will be more burdensome for the defendants to later rebut
that presumption. They may need to present a heightened evidentiary showing in order to convince the court that the lead
plaintiff does not adequately represent the class. This strengthens the argument in favor of allowing defendants to voice their
objections prior to class certification, for that may be their only
true opportunity to object. If only a cursory examination into
adequacy and typicality is conducted during the appointment
stage, then courts have a less urgent need to hear the defendants
that early in the litigation. However, such a perfunctory inquiry
contravenes the Reform Act's goal of placing control of the lawsuit in the hands of the party capable of adequately representing
the interests of the entire class.' 0 Legislative or judicial clarification as to the extent of the inquiry a court should conduct when
selecting a lead plaintiff under the statute would be helpful in
resolving this debate, but none seems forthcoming.
Despite Congress's intentions in enacting the PSLRA, securities class actions filings are at an all-time high and the size of
settlements is increasing drastically.' Since defendants have

""

See S 240 at 141 Cong Rec S 9114 (cited in note 32).
See In re CriticalPath, 156 F Supp 2d at 1110.
See Ferillo, et al, 1332 PLI/Corp at 439 (cited in note 5).
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more to lose than ever before, courts must take care to ensure
that they have at least one legitimate chance to defeat unjustifiable class certification. 132 Once the window has passed, a highpriced settlement seems inevitable, regardless of actual liabil3
ity.

13

4. The selection process gains legitimacy when courts are not
forced to raise defendants' objections sua sponte.
Courts and commentators have suggested that, in spite of the
majority rule that defendants do not have standing to challenge
the lead plaintiff appointment, defendants should not shy away
from raising concerns at the lead plaintiff stage because courts
may nonetheless read their submissions and raise their concerns
sua sponte. 34 However, since Howard Gunty has established that
the text of the Reform Act does not preclude hearing defendants'
objections to the adoption of the most adequate plaintiff presumption,' 35 courts no longer need to use this sua sponte "loophole" in
the law.
Permitting defendants to freely raise their own arguments in
open court will have several benefits. First, oral arguments will
save time in the long run by giving the court the opportunity to
ask questions of the defendants, as opposed to reading a written
statement and trying to discern the defendants' arguments. Second, defendants may be more willing to raise objections at this
early stage in litigation if they are given standing to do so openly.
Third, explicitly giving defendants authority to challenge the lead
plaintiff appointment gives the entire process more legitimacy.'
The practice of encouraging defendants to submit written statements of objections-despite having already ruled that they lack
standing to object, and then raising defendant's arguments sua
sponte implies that the court is bending the rules and circum132

See id at 440.

" See, for example, In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc, 51 F3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir 1995)
(finding concerns about forcing defendants to settle class actions under fear of bankruptcy
even if they have no legal liability).
" See, for example, Sarah R. Wolff and Casey L. Westover, Adequacy and Related

Class CertificationIssues: The Defendant'sPerspective, 1309 PLI/Corp 123, 135-36 (2002).
1
See Howard Gunty, Civ No 96-20711 SW, slip op at 6.
See Barry A. Miller, Sua Sponte Appellate Rulings: When Courts Deprive Litigants

of an Opportunity to Be Heard, 39 San Diego L Rev 1253, 1260 (2002) ("The adversary
system is based on the premise that allowing the parties to address the court on the decisive issue increases the accuracy of the decision. In addition, it increases the parties' sense
that the court's process and result are fair.").
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venting the law. Moreover, the court steps outside of its role as
independent decision maker and instead becomes an advocate for
one of the parties. 37 Courts of law should not appear to sanction
or encourage this kind of behavior, especially in this situation,
since the benefits they are trying to obtain-namely, more information about the lead plaintiff-are in fact accessible under the
statute.
CONCLUSION

From the defendants' perspective, the PSLRA has failed in
its attempts to reduce the costs of defending securities class actions. If the defendant knows from the outset that settling a lawsuit is preferable to the high costs of litigation, then the defendant has an incentive to reach settlement as early in the process
as possible. Once the most adequate plaintiff presumption has
been adopted, the defendant may choose to forego the costs of discovery and any further attempts to defeat class certification if it
feels that the showings of adequacy and typicality can no longer
be rebutted. The defendant would be forced into paying out a
huge settlement independent of the underlying merits of the lawsuit. Courts can avoid this situation, which is contrary to the explicit goals of the PSLRA, by allowing defendants to mount formal challenges to the court's selection of the lead plaintiff.
This Comment has made several textual and policy arguments as to why defendants should be permitted to raise objections to the appointment of the lead plaintiff prior to the class
certification stage. The court in Howard Gunty recognized that
nothing in the text of the PSLRA prevents defendants from challenging the adoption of the most adequate plaintiff presumption.'38 The legislative history establishes that Congress intended
the PSLRA to make securities class action suits less expensive to
litigate, so that defendants would not continually be forced into
unmerited settlements.1 39 Permitting challenges to most adequate
plaintiff presumptions could aid this goal by reducing the likelihood of re-litigation and facilitating the process of class certification. Providing courts with more information upon which to base
their decisions would benefit both plaintiffs and defendants, and
"' D. Scott Crook, Affirming the Untested: Affirming a Trial Court Based on Issues
Raised Sua Sponte, 14 Utah B J 10, 13 (2001).
' Civ No 96-20711 SW, slip op at 1.
,3 See Senate Report at 9, reprinted in 1995 USCCAN at 688 (cited in note 9).
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eliminating the need for courts to raise defendants' issues for
them sua sponte will help legitimize the entire judicial process.

I

